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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Trhe Florida Supreme Court, in the instant case, does not articulate
on the question of whether peaceful picketing that meets the "lawful pre-
requisites" will be permitted if (1) it is conducted by employees who
are members of a union (2) who are not the employees of the picketed
employer and (3) when the picketing has not been previously authorized
by a majority of the employees who would be governed by the picketing.
Instead, the court implies that such action would be unacceptable." Such
an implication, if utilized, would give rise to a legal policy inconsistent
with the weight of legal precedents and the logical, imperative interpretation
of thc constitutional guarantees of free speech.
The prerequisites to peaceful, lawful picketing established by statute
and by the court are reasonable and can be adhered to by individuals
and unions desiring to inform [he public and their fellow employees of
disputes between themselves and employers, whether the employers employ
union members or not. It is hoped that when the Florida Supreme Court
i§ squarely faced with a situation involving peaceful, lawful picketing by
members of a union, as such, who are not the employees of the subject
employer, it will act to eliminate this undesirable implication.
LAWRENCE C. PORTER
TORTS - CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The defendant ice company delivered a block of ice to the defendant
purchaser, depositing it on a public sidewalk adjacent to the defendant's
store. Plaintiff, an employee of the purchaser, brought an action for injuries
sustained when she slipped and fell in the water resulting from the melting
ice. Held, that as a matter of law, plaintiff's contributory negligence was
a complete bar to recovery. Chambers v. Southern Wholesale, Inc., 92 So.2d
188 (Fla. 1956).
The common law rule that coitributory negligence is a defense and
will bar recovery developed at a comparatively late date in the law of
negligence. It has been widely accepted and prevails in all but a few
9. Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255, 92 So.2d
415 (Fba. 19571. "... Nothing contained herein shall be construed as prohibiting any
number of employees less than a majority from engaging as individuals (as distinguished
from repre sentativcs of a labor union) in lawful picketing ..... " In this decision,
and in others, the Florida Supreme Court has pointed out that a majority approval
of the employees to be governed by the activity is not necessary prior to the undertaking
of picketing. Whitehead v. Miami Laundry Co., 36 So.2d 382 (Fla. 1948); Johnson v.
White Swan Laundry Co., 41 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1949).
1. The earliest reported case involving contributory negligence is B1utterfield %,.
Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
CASENOTES
jurisdictions. 2 The majority of the courts state the rule iin terms of "want of
ordinary care" and "proximate causation," but the true reason for the rule
probably lies in the inability to devise an acceptable method of apportioning
damages between a negligent defendant and a plaintiff whose negligence
is a concurring cause of his injury.4 Until such a method is devised, the law
must continue to deny any recovery to a negligent plaintiff5 in those juris-
dictions which have not adopted some form of comparative negligence
statute.0 The harshness of this result has led to a growing reluctance on the
part of courts to determine the existence of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.7
The courts apply substantially the same standards in determining a
plaintiff's negligence as those used in judging the negligence of the de-
fendant. As a general rule, negligence is the failure to exercise such care
as the ordinarily prudent person would under the same or similar circum-
stances.' Where contributory negligence is in issue, the question to be
determined in each case is whether the plaintiff has met the requirements
of this standard of conduct established for this reasonably prudent person
2. Mississippi and Arkansas are the only two states that have established apportion-
ment as a general rule. In these two jurisdictions the plaintiff's negligence is to be
considered only in apportioning damages. See ARE. AcT. 1955, No. 191; Miss. CODE
§ 1454 (1942). Nebraska and South Dakota divide damages subject to the limitation
that the negligence of the plaintiff must be "slight" as compared with that of the
defendant. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1943); S.D. LAws c. 160 § 184 (1941).
Georgia allows recovery if the plaintiff's negligence is found to be "less" than that
of the defendant. See GA. CODE § 105-603 (1936); Wisconsin allows recovery if the
plaintiff's negligence is "not as great as" that of the defendant. See Wis. STAT. §
331.045 (1955).
3. 38 AM. JuR., Negligence § 174, 848 (1941).
4. "Obviously any estimate that 40% of the total fault rests with the pedestrian
who walks out into the street in the path of an automobile, and 60% with the driver
who is not looking and runs him down, represents nothing resembling accuracy based
on demonstrable fact." Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Micn. L. REV. 465, 475
(1953).
5. Heller v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 324 Mo. 38, 23 S.W. 2d (1929); Wood
v. North Carolina Public Service Corp., 174 N.C. 697, 94 SE. 133 (1918); Spiller
v. Griffin, 109 S.C. 78, 95 S.E. 133 (1918).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. 43 A.B.A.J. 52 (1957).
8. Gallagher v. Delaware & H. R. Corp., 130 F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Pa. 1955);
U. S. v. McHugh, 103 F. Supp. (WV.D. Pa. 1952); Johnson v. Coleman, 179 Ark. 1087,
20 S.W.2d 186 (1929); Stedman v. O'Neil, 82 Conn. 199, 72 Atl. 923 (1909); Beck
v. Artesian Water Co., 8 Terry 405, 91 A.2d 545 (1952); State v. Arnold, 3 Terry
47, 27 A.2d 81 (1942); Southern Ry. v. Harpe, 223 Ind. 124, 58 N.E.2d 346 (1944);
Brooks-Calloway Co. v. Carroll, 235 Ky. 41, 29 S.W.2d 592 (1930); Grummcl v.
Decker, 294 Mich. 71, 292 N.W. 562 (1940); Peterson v. Minneapolis St. Ry.,
226 Minn. 27, 31 N.W.2d 905 (1948)1 Beckman v. Kinder, 237 Mo. App. 52, 165
S.W.2d 311 (1942); Mundy v. Davis, 154 Neb. 423, 48 N.W.2d 394 (1952); lemp-
stead v. Robinson, 1 N. J. 31, 61 A.2d 583 (1948); Miheal v. Pendleton, 237 N. C.
690, 75 S.E.2d 756 (1953); Gedon v. East Ohio Gas Co., 128 Ohio St. 335, 190
N.E. 924 (1934); Lanni v. Pennsylvania Ry., 371 Pa. 106, 88 A.2d 2887 (1952);
Thomas v. Casey, 149 Dec. 13, 297 P.2d 614 (Wash. 1956).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
for his own protectionY Ordinarily, the test is to be applied by the jury, 10
but in those cases where reasonable men could draw only one conclusion
from the facts, and that conclusion clearly establishes negligence on the
part of the plaintiff, the court should so declare it as a matter of law."
The plaintiff is required to use his faculties to discover danger and
conditions of danger, and if he is injured as a result of his failure to
do so, he will be barred from recovery by his contributory negligence. 12
However, if there is a dangerous condition, it must be so obvious that a
person using due care under the same or similar circumstances would
avoid it.' ,.
In the instant case, the court determined that the plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law. This decision is justified within
the prevailing rule,14 and is in accord with previous decisions of the
court.'5 The plaintiff's failure to use due care was the proximate cause
of the injury.' The plaintiff stated she could have avoided the risk.'
1
Knowledge of the danger could be imputed to her."' Under these circum-
stances the court was justified in holding the plaintiff contributorily negli-
gent as a matter of law.
The solution to the problem of the contributory negligence rule does
not lie in an endless discussion of whether the plaintiff's negligence is a
matter of law or fact. It is submitted that the rule itself is basically wrong.
It places the entire burden of the loss caused by the negligence of two
parties upon the plaintiff alone. Any general requirement such as exists
in Arizona'9 and Oklahoma20 providing that all questions of contributory
9. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 463 (1934).
10. U. S. Consumers Power Co. v. Nash, 164 F.2d 657 (S.D. Mich. 1947);
Wicker v. Roberts, 91 Ga. App. 490, 86 S.E.2d 350 (1955); Smith v. American Oil
Co., 77 Ga. App. 463, 49 S.E.2d 90 (1948); McManan v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp., 400 Ill 423, 81 N.E.2d 137 (1948); Ryan v. Griffin, 241 Minn. 91, 62 N.W.2d
504 (1954); Kilmer v. Bean, 48 Wash. 2d 848, 296 P.2d 992 (1956).
11. Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71, 67 N.E.2d 162 (1946); Gillett v. Mich. United
Tractor Co., 205 Mich. 410, 171 N.W. 537 (1919); Miller v. Borough of Exter,
366 Pa. 306, 77 A.2d 396 (1951); Dauks v. Pittsburgh Ry., 328 Pa. 356, 195 At.
16 (1937); Lohr v. Payne, 115 Wash. 691, 196 Pac. 655 (1921).
12. U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Balfan, 193 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1951).
13. Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 366 I11. 330. 8 N.W.2d 934 (1937); Lebanon
v. Groves, 178 Ky., 749, 199 S.W. 1064 (1918); Gillison v. Osborne, 200 Minn. 122,
19 N.W.2d 1 (1945); Smith v. Manning's, Inc., 12 Wash. 2d 573, 126 P.2d 44 (1942).
14. See note 11 supra.
15. Becksted v. Riverside Bank of Miami, 85 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1956); Brant v.
Van Zandt, 77 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1955); Pettigrew v. Nite Cap, Inc., 63 So.2d 492
(Fla. 1953); Bowles v. Elkes Pontiac Co., 63 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1952); Breau v. 'Whit-
more, 59 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1952).
16. 38 Am . Jun., Negligence, § 174, 848 (1941)
17. "She testified that she saw the water iust about the time she stepped in it
but that there was nothing to prevent her seeing it from the time she got out of the
car." Chambers v. Southern Wholesale, Inc., 92 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1956).
18. "The puddle of water was plainly visible. She knew as well as the defendants
the extent to which water may render a concrete sidewalk slippery." Chambers v.
Southern Wholesale, Inc., 92 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1956).
19. ARIz. CoNsT. Art. XVIII, § 5.
20. OLnA. CoNsT. Art. XXIII, § 6.
CASENOTES
negligence must be submitted to the jury would merely have a tendency
to shift the burden from the plaintiff to the defendant. This would not
solve the problem. What is needed is legislation which would establish
an equitable method of apportioning damages. This could be accomplished
by statutes which would allow the jury to render special verdicts as to
the amount of damages recoverable if they find no contributory negligence,




TORTS - SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Plaintiffs, the natural parents of an illegitimate son, brought suit for
the wrongful death of their child under Article 2315 of the Louisiana
Civil Code, which provides for the survival of actions for wrongful acts.
Held, illegitimates are not included within the meaning of the act; thus
action for the wrongful death of an illegitimate child does not survive in
favor of natural parents. Cheeks v. The Fidelity 6 Casualty Co. of New
York, 87 So.2d 377 (La. 1956).
A group of American courts' has held that death statutes modeled
on Lord Campbell's Act,2 and using the words "mother," "father," and
"child," include only legitimates. This was the view expressed by Chief
Baron Pollock soon after the original law.- The rationale of the rule was
that legislation must be presumed to be enacted in the light of the
common law and does not give rights denied by the common law to a
class separated from the common mass, without express intention. 4 The
reasoning rested upon the doctrine that a bastard is nullius filius and has
no ancestor.5 On that basis, an illegitimate was not allowed to recover
for the wrongful death of its father. 6 nor was a mother allowed to recover
21. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REV. 465, 508 (1953).
1. Ga.: Robinson v. R. & Banking Co., 117 Ga. 169, 43 S.E. 452 (1903); Ind.:
McDonald v. Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. Ry., 44 Ind., 159, 43 N.E. 447 (18961; La.:
Lynch v. Knoop, 118 La. 611, 43 So. 252 (1907); Md. State v. Hagerstown &
Frederick Ry., 139 Md. 78, 114 Atl. 729 (1921); Miss.: Alabama & V. Ry. v. Williams,
78 Miss. 209, 28 So. 853 (1900); N.Y.: Hiser v. Davis, 234 N.Y. 300, 137 N.E. 596
(1922); Ohio: Bonewit v. Weber, 95 Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E.2d 738 (1952); Pa.:
Molz v. Hansell, 115 Pa. Super. 338, 175 Atl. 880 (1934); S.C.: McDonald v. Southern
Ry., 71 S.C. 352, 51 S.E. 138 (1905); Vt.: Good v. Towns, 56 Vt. 410, 48 Am. Rep.
799 (1883).
2. Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. 1, c. 93.
3. Dickinson v. The North Eastern fv., 2 Hurl. & C. 735, 159 Eng. Rep. 304
(Exch. 1863), "But beyond all doubt in the construction of this Act of Parliament
the word 'child' means legitimate child only."
4. Alabama & V. fy. v. Williams, 78 Miss. 209, 28 So. 853 (1900).
5. 1 BLACKSTONE, CoME.sFNTARIEs 458 (10th ed. 1787), "... for he [bastard]
can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody. .. "
6. Bonewit v. Vebcr, 95 Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E.2d 738 (1952).
